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Summary
When predicting financial profits [1], relationship outcomes
[2], longevity [3], or professional success [4], people habitu-
ally underestimate the likelihood of future negative events
(for review see [5]). This well-known bias, termed unrealistic
optimism [6], is observed across age [7], culture [8], and
species [9] and has a significant societal impact on domains
ranging from financial markets to health and well being.
However, it is unknown how neuromodulatory systems
impact on the generation of optimistically biased beliefs.
This question assumes great importance in light of evidence
that common neuropsychiatric disorders, such as depres-
sion, are characterized by pessimism [10, 11]. Here, we
show that administration of a drug that enhances dopami-
nergic function (dihydroxy-L-phenylalanine; L-DOPA) in-
creases an optimism bias. This effect is due to L-DOPA
impairing the ability to update belief in response to undesir-
able information about the future. These findings provide
the first evidence that the neuromodulator dopamine im-
pacts on belief formation by reducing negative expectations
regarding the future.
Results
Humans are optimistically biased when making predictions
about the future, habitually underestimating the likelihood of
negative events [1–8]. This bias is related to a striking asymme-
try whereby people update their beliefs more in response to
information that is better than expected compared to informa-
tion that is worse than expected [12, 13]. Selective updating is
mediated by regions of the frontal cortex that track errors in
estimation when these call for positive update but show a rela-
tive failure to code for errors that might induce a negative
update [12].
An unresolved question is whether neuromodulators associ-
ated with generating expectations of future outcomes influ-
ence this process. A prominent candidate is the monoamine*Correspondence: t.sharot@ucl.ac.ukdopamine, a neuromodulator suggested to provide a teaching
signal that indexes when predictions fail to align with out-
comes [14, 15]. In Parkinson’s disease, drugs enhancing dopa-
minergic function (e.g., dihydroxy-L-phenylalanine; L-DOPA)
influence learning of positive and negative outcomes in an
asymmetric manner, enhancing the former and impairing the
latter [16]. Dopamine effects on learning have been extensively
studied in the context of model-free reinforcement learning
[14–16]. However, it also impacts on domains as diverse as
working memory, episodic memory, and reversal learning
[17, 18]. Given these set of findings [12, 16], we hypothesize
that enhancing dopamine function will influence how healthy
individuals incorporate information about probabilities of
future life events in an asymmetric manner, increasing an opti-
mism bias.
To test whether an optimism bias is modulated by dopa-
mine, participants completed a belief update task [12] on
two separate days, oneweek apart (Figure 1), in a double-blind
placebo-controlled pharmacological intervention study. On
one of the days, participants received placebo and on the
other they received L-DOPA (150 mg), in a counterbalanced
order (n = 21). The task was identical on both days except
for the fact that different stimuli were used on each day (lists
were counterbalanced). At each session, participants pro-
vided estimates of their likelihood of experiencing 40 different
types of adverse life events (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease,
robbery; see the List of Stimuli in the Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures available online) adapted from a previous
study [12]. After each trial, they were presented with an actu-
arial average probability of that event occurring to a person
from the same sociocultural environment. We then assessed
whether participants used this information to update their
predictions by subsequently asking them to again estimate
their likelihoods for the same 40 events in a second session,
taking place w15 min after the first session. They also com-
pleted a memory test for the information presented and rated
all stimuli on different subjective scales (for a full description,
see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
To test whether effects might be observed when manipu-
lating another neuromodulator implicated in learning about
reward and punishment, we administered the serotonergic
reuptake inhibitor citalopram (24 mg in oral drops, equivalent
to 30 mg in tablets) to a second group of participants (n =
19). Serotonin neurotransmission is suggested to be involved
in aversive processing and inhibition ([19, 20], but see [21]).
However, the nature of its role in learning is less established
than is the case for dopamine.
Optimism Bias Grows with Increased Dopamine Function
We found that enhancing participants’ dopamine function in-
creased their prediction bias in an optimistic direction. Specif-
ically, for each participant on each trial, we subtracted the
participant’s estimation of how likely they were to encounter
the negative event from the average probability of encoun-
tering that event (i.e., estimation error = estimation 2 proba-
bility presented). If the average estimation error was negative,
then this indicated that participants tended to underestimate





















































Figure 1. Task Design
(A) On each trial, participants were presented with a short description of one of 40 adverse life events and asked to estimate how likely this event was to
occur to them. They were then presented with the average probability of that event occurring to a person like themselves, living in the same sociocultural
environment. For each event, an estimation error term was calculated as the difference between the participant’s estimation and the information provided.
The second session was the same as the first session. For each event, an update term was calculated as the absolute difference between the participant’s
first and second estimations. Participants completed both sessions twice on two separate days, with different stimuli, once under placebo and once after
the administration of the drug.
(B and C) Examples of trials for which the participant’s estimate was higher (B) or lower (C) than the average probability. Here, for illustration purposes, the
blue and red frames denote the participant’s response (either an overestimation or underestimation, respectively). For illustration purposes, the blue and red
filled boxes denote information that calls for an adjustment in an optimistic (desirable) (B) or pessimistic (undesirable) (C) direction.
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predictions). A positive number indicated a bias in a pessi-
mistic direction, and a score of zero indicated that the extent
of overestimation is equal to that of underestimation. Note
that if the average estimation error is small in magnitude, this
does not imply that the subject is accurate in their estimation;
rather, it reflects that they are not biased in any particular
direction.
For each subject, the change in average estimation errors
(i.e., the change in bias = bias after presentation of
information 2 bias before the presentation of information)
was calculated and compared using a one-way analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) with condition (drug/placebo) as factor
and differential scores on all subjective scales and memory
controlled for by entering them as covariates (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures for details). The change in
bias in the L-DOPA condition was greater than in the placebo
condition [F(1,14) = 9.37, p < 0.01] (Figure 2A). As shown in Fig-
ure 2A, the change in bias in the L-DOPA condition was due to
an effect in the optimistic direction and significantly different
from zero [t(20) = 2.99, p < 0.01].The change in bias in the citalopram condition was
not different from in the placebo condition [F(1,12) = 0.01,
p > 0.9]. We note that no assays of plasma drug levels or
changes in endocrine measures were documented, which
might have shown that the drug levels were not adequate to
produce significant changes.
L-DOPA Impairs Updating in Response to Undesirable
Information Regarding the Future
Wenext investigated whether L-DOPA increased the optimism
bias by enhancing learning from desirable information re-
garding the future, decreasing learning from undesirable infor-
mation, or both. To this end, as implemented previously [12],
we divided trials into those for which the average probability
of experiencing a negative life event was better than the partic-
ipants’ own probability estimate (i.e., trials for which a subject
received desirable information) relative to a situationwhere the
average probability was worse (i.e., subjects received unde-
sirable information). The average degree of absolute belief
update was then computed for each participant and condition































































































Figure 2. L-DOPA Enhances the Optimism Bias by Impairing Update for Undesirable Information
(A) Change in bias is equal to the bias after participants were presented with the average probability minus the bias before. Bias is equal to the signed esti-
mation errors (= participant’s estimate of the likelihoods of encountering future adverse events2 average probability presented). Note that the extent of the
bias does not signify accuracy. A score of zero indicates that the extent of overestimation is equal to the extent of underestimation (i.e., errors are not biased
in any direction). A negative score indicates bias is optimistic; a positive score indicates bias is pessimistic. Administration of L-DOPA enhanced the change
in bias toward an optimistic direction (after controlling for differential memory and differential scores on all rating scales). See also Table S1.
(B) Absolute update (participant’s second estimate 2 first estimate) for trials where participants received desirable information that presented an oppor-
tunity to adopt a more optimistic outlook, and for trials where they received undesirable information calling for a more pessimistic estimate. Update in
response to undesirable information was reduced in the L-DOPA condition relative to placebo.
(C) The decrease in updating from negative information in the L-DOPA condition relative to placebo is shown for all subjects. Subjects are ordered according
to the magnitude of the effect (ascending).
Error bars represent SEM corrected for within-subject design [22]. *p < 0.05.
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1479estimatej). We found that L-DOPA selectively impaired belief
update in response to undesirable information about the future
(Figure 2B). Specifically, a 2 (condition: L-DOPA/placebo) by 2
(valence: desirable/undesirable) ANCOVA on update scores
revealed a significant interaction [F(1,14) = 7.4, p < 0.02]. The
interaction was characterized by a reduction in update magni-
tude in response to undesirable information under L-DOPA
relative to placebo [t(20) = 3.03, p < 0.01, observed in 76% of
the participants; Figure 2C], but there was no significant differ-
ence in response to desirable information under L-DOPA rela-
tive to placebo [t(20) = 0.34, p > 0.7]. Thus, selective updating,
whereby participants update their beliefs when receiving
desirable information relative to undesirable information, was
enhanced by L-DOPA.
Our findings were not explained by valence-dependent
effects of L-DOPA onmemory (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for a full description of how memory scores were
calculated), emotional arousal, extent of negative valence,
sense of familiarity, or sense of past experience with the
adverse life events, because all these variables were added as
covariates in all ANCOVAs (see Table S1 for scores on all vari-
ables and Supplemental Experimental Procedures foradescriptionofall scales).Note thatL-DOPAtended to increase
memory for the informationprovided [F(1,20)=3.67,p=0.07], an
effect that reached significance for desirable information only
[desirable: t(20) = 2.12, p < 0.05; undesirable: t(20) = 1.2, p >
0.1], although there was no interaction [F(1,20) = 0.46, p > 0.5;
Figure 3]. Furthermore, L-DOPA did not cause side effects,
nor did it affect mood or reaction times (see Tables S1 and S2).
We observed no effect of citalopram on updating [main
effect of condition: F(1,12) = 1.7, p > 0.6; interaction between
condition and valence: F(1,12) = 0.8, p > 0.8]. Although citalo-
pram did not impact on updating, this does not imply that
citalopram, or serotonin function, does not influence opti-
mism. An optimism bias can in principle be generated via
a number of different mechanisms [5, 12, 23], and it is possible
that serotonin could impact on expectations by altering other
processes, such as mental simulation of future events [23] or
increased memory for positive emotions [24].
Discussion
We show that a tendency to incorporate undesirable informa-



















Figure 3. Memory for Information Provided
Memory performance for the information provided was calculated as the
absolute difference between the statistical number presented for each
event and the participants’ recollection of that number. These memory
errors are presented for trials where participants received desirable infor-
mation that presented an opportunity to adopt a more optimistic outlook,
and for trials where they received undesirable information calling for
a more pessimistic estimate, in the L-DOPA and placebo conditions. Error
bars represent SEM corrected for within-subject design [22]. *p < 0.05.
See also Table S1.
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1480dopamine levels are enhanced. This leads to an underestima-
tion of the likelihood of negative events, a fundamental charac-
teristic of unrealistic optimism. Previously, we reported that
increasing dopamine function while people imagined positive
future events enhanced expectations of pleasure to be derived
from those events [25]. Whereas dopamine in our previous
study altered hedonic expectancies, in the current study we
show that enhancing dopamine influences positive expecta-
tions by attenuating the impact of unexpected negative infor-
mation. In this regard, our findings convergewith observations
from patients with Parkinson’s disease where enhanced dopa-
minergic levels lead to impaired learning from unwanted
outcomes [16]. Although the latter study differed significantly
from ours, not only in terms of the target population (Parkinso-
nian patients rather than healthy individuals) but also in rela-
tion to a requirement to learn from actual outcomes (rather
than information of possible future outcomes) in the context
of a reinforcement learning task, we suggest that the under-
lying mechanisms may be shared. Specifically, L-DOPA
administration may interfere with dopamine dips, the putative
mechanism signaling a worse-than-expected outcome [26, 27]
suggested to support learning from negative prediction errors
[16, 28]. We speculate that dopamine modulation of frontal
cortex function may explain the current results, given that
dopamine plays a modulatory role in cognition through its
extensive diffuse projections from midbrain dopamine nuclei
to the basal ganglia and frontal cortical areas [29–31].
Note that we do not conclude that the effect of L-DOPA is
specific to learning about possible future outcomes (differen-
tial effects of dopamine on the impact of positive and negative
outcomes may be general). Instead, the relevance of our find-
ings is in providing an explanation of how dopamine enhances
unrealistic optimism. Interestingly, our results also hint at
a possible mechanism by which antidepressant medication
that targets dopamine function might reduce depressive
symptoms and cognitions [32]. A core symptom profile inmajor depression disorder is pessimistic beliefs [10]. Individ-
uals with mild depression exhibit less biased expectations
than healthy individuals, whereas those with severe depres-
sion express a pessimistic bias [11]. By reducing the pro-
bability of updating expectations in response to negative
information, medication that enhances dopamine levels might
lead to a diminution of a pessimistic outlook in depressed
patients.
Understanding how predictions of future life events are
altered is critical for understanding human action and decision
making, which is largely driven by predictions of likely negative
and positive outcomes [33–35]. It is also key to understanding
how expectations go awry in neuropsychiatric disorders
where dopamine function is an implicated mechanism, in-
cluding depression [32], addiction [36], and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder [37]. Our data provide novel evidence
that pharmacological manipulation of the neurotransmitter
dopamine alters the efficiency of human belief updating, re-
ducing negative expectations in a manner that leads to a
boosting of unrealistic optimism.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Forty participants were recruited via the University College London
psychology subject pool. Participants were randomly assigned to either
the L-DOPA condition (n = 21, mean age 23.9 years, 11 females, 10 males)
or the citalopram condition (n = 19, mean age 22.5 years, 10 females,
9 males). The study was double blind. All subjects gave informed consent
and were paid for their participation. They completed a screening form for
significant medical conditions, signed a form declaring that they were not
receiving other medications or using illicit drugs, and were paid for their
participation.
Stimuli
Eighty short descriptions of negative life events (e.g., car theft, Parkinson’s
disease; see the List of Stimuli in the Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures) were presented. Stimuli were split into two lists of 40 events each.
One list was used on day 1 and the other on day 2, randomly assigned.
For each adverse event, the average probability of that event occurring at
least once to a person living in the same sociocultural environment as the
participants was determined based on online resources. Very rare or very
common events were not included; all event probabilities lay between
10% and 70%. To ensure that the range of possible overestimation was
equal to the range of possible underestimation, participants were told that
the range of probabilities was between 3% and 77%.
Procedure
Participants completed the task on two days one week apart. On one day
they received placebo, and on the other day either L-DOPA (150 mg)
together with benserazide (37.5 mg, which promotes higher levels of dopa-
mine in the brain while minimizing side effects from peripheral dopamine,
such as nausea and vomiting) 2 hr before task completion, or citalopram
(24 mg in drops, which is equivalent to 30 mg in tablet) 4 hr before task
completion; order was randomly assigned and counterbalanced. L-DOPA’s
half-life isw1.5 hr (peaks at 1 hr) and citalopram’s isw35 hr (peaks at 4 hr).
After completing the main task, subjects completed the memory test and
additional ratings (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) and
a subjective state questionnaire [38] (see Table S1 for scores). Before
completing the task, subjects participated in a separate fMRI study using
a go/no-go task [39]. There is no a priori theoretical link between the two
studies, and the reason for using the same subjects in both tasks was purely
efficiency.
Task
On each trial, a stimulus was presented on screen for 2 s. During that time,
participants were instructed to think of that event happening to them in the
future. When the words ‘‘Estimation of happening?’’ appeared on screen
they were to estimate how likely the event was to happen to them in the
future. Participants had up to 6 s to respond using the keyboard. If the
participant failed to respond, that trial was excluded from all consequent
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1481analyses. A fixation cross then appeared for 1–3 s (jittered). Next, the event
description appeared again for 2 s together with the average probability of
that event occurring. Finally, a fixation cross appeared for 1–3 s (jittered).
Immediately after completing 40 trials, participants estimated all events
again. The procedure was the same as above, except that the average prob-
ability of the event occurring was not presented again.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and two tables and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.cub.2012.05.053.
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